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 Introduction
Where liberal societies provide freedoms concerning speech, religious be-
lief, or other matters of personal conscience, disagreement inevitably fol-
lows. Yet even where disagreement reigns, there is no shortage of confi-
dence on any side.
To some philosophers, confidence in the face of disagreement is at
worst irrational and dubiously dogmatic; and at best, such confidence may
only be had by conscientiously reckoning with the fact that a great many
highly intelligent and well-read individuals—people whom one would re-
gard as at least one’s intellectual peers—have reached opposing conclu-
sions. How one must reckon with such disagreement is hotly debated
among epistemologists. I don’t intend to settle such matters here. This
essay offers an overview of how philosophers have approached problems
of disagreement, with a special focus on religious diversity and disagree-
ment. By the end I shall discuss some novel considerations that seem
distinctive of religious inquiry, and which complicate the application of
prominent views in the epistemology of disagreement.
 Epistemological Puzzles of Disagreement
Disagreement has received a great deal of recent attention in mainstream
epistemology. Yet the main questions were originally posed by philoso-
See especially Feldman and Warfield ; Christensen and Lackey , and the
Ferrari and Pedersen chapter in this volume.

phers who had their eye on the significance of religious disagreement (see
Gutting ; van Inwagen , – and , ; Plantinga ;
Rosen , –). We will first survey some issues raised by disagree-
ment, and then in § consider more explicit applications to religious (and
atheist) belief.
Why should disagreement matter to how we think about epistemol-
ogy? First, notice our general tendency to reconsider our beliefs when we
discover that others disagree. In particular, when we regard our inter-
locutors as being as being our peers—as well-informed as we, and of simi-
lar intelligence (and not joking with us)—then learning that they disagree
often results in our suspending judgment on the matter. Similar results
apply when we move from full belief, disbelief, and suspension of belief, to
finer-grained doxastic states like degrees of belief or subjective probabil-
ities, sometimes called credences: if you have a . credence that it will
rain today in our area, whereas I have only . credence that it will rain
today, and we both updated on evidence from what we regard as equally
reliable sources about the weather, you will likely lower your credence
from . (and I will likely raise mine from .). Or consider David Chris-
tensen’s check-splitting case (, ): we go to dinner, and we agreed
to split the check evenly, adding a % tip. We each mentally calculate
our share, and I become highly confident that our shares are $, whereas
you become highly confident that we each owe $. How should we re-
act to each other’s beliefs? Presumably we will each lower our confidence,
and rethink our calculations, since either (or both of us) may have made
a mistake. Similar cases can be given about perceptual judgments rather
than mental reasoning, for example, that you and your friend each see the
end of a horse race, from nearly identical viewing points, but you disagree
about which horse won (Kelly , ).
For some philosophers, what we typically do in these disagreements is
thought to be indicative of what we ought to do if we are to be rational:
we ought, in such cases, be conciliatory to our peer by reducing our con-
Hereafter, unless otherwise stated, I shall use “belief” as a catch-all to refer to both
full and partial belief, such that“lowering” one’s confidence can mean either dropping
one’s full belief in favor or suspending judgment, or reducing one’s credence.

fidence in our initial conclusion, by suspending judgment or shifting cre-
dence toward the peer’s. The normative principles behind why we ought
to do this, according to these Strong Conciliationists, can vary. Some en-
dorse an “Equal Weight” view, according to which one must grant equal
evidential weight to my peer’s opinion as I do to my own.
Many think that implicit in such views is the idea that a set of evidence
only supports one doxastic response. Consider the principle Uniqueness:
Uniqueness Given one’s total evidence, there is a unique rational
doxastic attitude that one can take to any proposition.
If Uniqueness is false, there is room for thinking that there could be rea-
sonable disagreements, even among peers who have the same evidence.
Denying Uniqueness amounts to endorsing a permissive view of what ra-
tionality requires, such that one’s evidence may rationally support more
than one doxastic position. Thus one might be what White () calls
a radical permissivist, by thinking that, at least in some circumstances,
one’s total evidence can permit either believing that p or believing that
¬p. But if rationality were that permissive, it is hard to see why disagree-
ment would ever put pressure on us: for people even with identical evi-
dence could reasonably disagree, on the grounds that said evidence can
reasonably support believing either way. Less controversially, one might
be a moderate permissivist by denying this radical view yet insisting that,
at least in some circumstances, one’s total evidence can permit, say, either
believing that p or suspending judgment on p. More moderate still would
be a view that denies each of the above concerning outright belief and
withholding belief, but allows that in some circumstances, one’s evidence
at least makes rational a (perhaps small) range of credences (Schoenfield
).
Perhaps conciliatory pressure is due to the idea that learning of a peer’s
differing response gives you new evidence, higher-order evidence, which
See Elga , Christensen , and Cohen .
However, see Christensen , who argues that Conciliationism can be motivated
even without Uniqueness.
White , , and Feldman , .

bears on how well you handled the initial evidence. Feldman insisted
that learning of a peer’s reaching a different conclusion, on the basis of
the same evidence, amounts to evidence against one’s own conclusion be-
cause “evidence that there is evidence that p is evidence for p” (Feldman
, ). Such a principle says that discovering that a peer concludes
differently on the basis of the same evidence E provides new higher-order
evidence that I have misconstrued what E supports. More specifically,
Feldman recently argues for
EEE If S has evidence, E, supporting the proposition that there is
someone who has evidence that supports p, then S has some
evidence, E, that supports p. (, )
Such a principle could explain why it often seems we ought to reduce our
confidence in such situations. However, EEE cannot be correct. Suppose
your friend Joe is to guess which one of three objects you are about to put
into an empty box: an apple, a ball, or some cheese. Out of his sight, you
put in the apple; so you, but not he, know that there is an apple in the box.
You then tell Joe that it isn’t a ball in the box. Given what Joe knows about
the setup, your testimony provides Joe with some evidence there is cheese
in the box, because Joe’s learning that it’s not a ball raises the probability
for him that it’s cheese in the box. As the antecedent of EEE has it, you
have evidence (E) that there is someone (Joe) who has evidence which
supports (p) that there is cheese in the box; but because you know there is
no cheese in the box, your knowing E is not, for you, evidence supporting
that there is cheese inside. (If it were, then by merely telling Joe that what
you put in the box isn’t a ball, you thereby would have acquired some
additional evidence that you didn’t put in an apple. But that’s absurd.) So
EEE is false.
Principles like Uniqueness or EEE appeal to one’s evidence without
stipulating exactly what evidence is or what it takes to “have” it. Notice
Note that Feldman’s replies to objections to EEE (, –) don’t apply to
this case. See Fitelson  for a refutation of Feldman’s earlier slogan, which also casts
doubt on EEE.
As Hawthorne and Srinivasan  point out, if one takes a highly externalist view

that one’s background beliefs (or one’s prior probability function), while
not typically deemed a part of the relevant evidence, plays a crucial role
in how one rationally updates on new evidence to arrive at one’s beliefs.
For example, if you and I both hear the same testimony from John that he
has bought a new sportscar, you might believe him while I—since I also
believe it is April Fools’ Day—do not believe him. If we don’t count my
background belief about the date as part of the evidence, then clearly, it
can be reasonable for us to have different doxastic responses to the same
(testimonial) evidence. Similarly, much depends here on what it takes for
us to possess the “same evidence”. Suppose we just consider propositions
as used in a deductive argument: do two individuals who disagree on what
to conclude from it (one infers by modus ponens, the other by modus tollens)
count as “having the same evidence”? Is it possible to have some p as
evidence when you dismiss it as false? Does one have perceptual evidence
when one believes one has just taken a hallucinogen?
Apart from such principles about evidence, some appeal explicitly to
the notion of an epistemic defeater to suggest that the nature of certain
disagreements defeats the justification one might need in order to know,
or even acceptably believe, one’s views (Goldberg , , ). On
such an approach, acknowledging that certain peer disagreements are sys-
tematic presents one with a defeater for the justification one might have for
one’s belief. Systematic disagreements are (i) widespread, (ii) entrenched,
and (iii) non-localized, i.e., involving many related matters rather than
the dispute being only over a particular local proposition. Such defeaters
are not easily dispensed with (e.g., by defeating them with some other
evidence which would defeat the defeater), because such disagreements
induce the concern that even those who are believe truly were somehow
lucky to arrive at the truth. Given this, systematic disagreements seem to
rob one’s beliefs of justification.
But matters are rarely as clean-cut as the idealized cases to which Con-
of evidence, such as Williamson’s (, Ch. ) E=K view, the problems concerning
disagreement looks quite different.
Though widely used in epistemology, the viability of defeat in epistemology has
come under challenge: see Lasonen-Aarnio , Hawthorne and Srinivasan , and
Baker-Hytch and Benton .

ciliationists appeal. In how many cases do we actually have the exact same
evidence as our interlocutor? Or similarly, how often is one’s disagreeing
interlocutor really thought to be intellectual peer (King )? These and
similar worries have led many to think that there just is nothing general to
be said about what one should do when one faces disagreements even with
one’s peers (see Hawthorne and Srinivasan , and Matheson ).
Many have criticized the blanket way in which some Conciliationists
have aimed to offer a universal principle of rationality which would cover
all the relevant cases. A common objection is that (unrestricted) Concilia-
tionism is self-undermining: many philosophers, who presumably regard
each other as peers and consider all the same arguments, disagree over the
truth of (unrestricted) Conciliationism. So by the (unrestricted) Concili-
ationist’s lights, one should not be very confident in their own view (see
Elga ; cf. Pittard b for a way out).
Kelly (, , ) raises several concerns with versions of Con-
ciliationism, even for idealized cases. One worry is that deferring to one’s
peer by reducing one’s confidence amounts to an illicit double-counting
of the evidence. Suppose we each begin with the same grounds E bear-
ing on whether p; and we disclose that I’ve concluded p whereas you, ¬p.
My treating your contrary belief, reached from your evaluation of E, as
an added reason to believe ¬p is to allow E to have additional eviden-
tial weight (processed through you) beyond what I’ve already given it.
And somewhat awkwardly, in doing this, I would be treating the fact that
you believe ¬p on the basis of E, as a reason for me to believe ¬p even
though you wouldn’t yourself regard your believing that ¬p as an addi-
tional reason—on top of E—for believing ¬p (Kelly , ff.). But if it
would be illicit for you to use the fact that you believe it as further reason
to believe it, why should it be okay for me to do this?
Another worry is that doing what the Equal Weight view requires can
lead one away from the rational attitude required by Uniqueness. Suppose
there is a fact about the degree to which evidence E supports p, namely,
that it makes p . probable. Upon evaluating E, your credence in p is,
quite rightly, ., whereas I quite unreasonably arrive at a credence of ..
In such a case you have fulfilled the uniquely rational doxastic attitude

given E. But when we meet and discuss our evidence and our conflicting
credences, the Equal Weight view requires that you must, to be rational,
split the difference with me and we must both then be . confident in
p. But to do this would be for you to depart from the uniquely rational
attitude toward p given E. Thus the Equal Weight view results in making
the original E irrelevant to the bearing of our new evidence (which in-
cludes E but also includes the facts about what credences we had reached
upon consulting E) on p; the actual evidence bearing on p gets completely
swamped by psychological facts about what the two of us believe (Kelly
, –).
There is something to be said for the idea that the one who has in fact
reasoned properly to the conclusion supported by the evidence (even if
that conclusion is that the evidence supports suspending judgment), may
sometimes remain steadfast, and rationally so, in her doxastic position; it
is, after all, the one who has made a mistake who should revise their po-
sition. If something like this is correct, then what one ought to do in
cases of disagreement is not independent of who has rightly handled the
evidence. “Steadfasters” like Kelly want to insist that what Conciliation-
ism gets wrong is that each party in a disagreement owes the same belief
revision regardless of who is closer to the truth. Indeed, one might draw
on the defeater epistemology of disagreement to argue that, in a case of
peer disagreement, those who reasoned imperfectly from the evidence are
most plausibly the ones whose justification is defeated: for if there is some
fact about how they evaluated the evidence that they should have under-
stood, which if apprised of would lead them to change their beliefs, that
fact seems like a good candidate for generating defeaters.
Though epistemologists working on disagreement have considered ab-
stract and highly idealized cases, the issues they raise provide the back-
drop for turning to matters raised by religious disagreement.
The trouble, of course, is that from within the disagreer’s perspective, one cannot
tell who that is.
For an account of evidence one should have had, and how it might issue in normative
defeaters, see Goldberg ; for criticisms, see Benton .

 Religious Disagreement
Religion is a controversial domain: religions distinguish themselves by
making various claims about the supernatural, humanity, and how to live.
Even among religious adherents who share certain core religious commit-
ments, there remains much disagreement between sects or denominations
over doctrine, worship, spirituality, the afterlife, and so on. Contribut-
ing to this diversity are the many non-religious or irreligious, particularly
atheists, who think that nearly all positive claims (at least about the exis-
tence of the supernatural) are false. For simplicity’s sake, we shall focus on
the basic positions of the theist, atheist, and agnostic, though it should
be clear that the structural issues may extend to diversity between reli-
gions (or atheisms).
Complicating matters are concerns about what counts as evidence in
the religious domain, whether some forms of evidence are more probative
than others, and whether one must grant more weight to public or shared
evidence. For example, philosophical arguments often present themselves
as publically available and neutral reasoning about, say, whether there is a
God, whereas those who appeal to religious experience (Alston ) as a
kind of evidence for God typically conceive of such evidence as inherently
private. Testimony from trusted individuals, or from an entire tradition
(cf. Zagzebski ), can form another kind of ground for belief or disbe-
lief, and it may be that such testimony can ground religious beliefs even
in the midst of religious diversity (Baker-Hytch ). But the epistemic
force of that testimony may depend whether the testifier functions as an
authority or as a kind of expert advisor (see Lackey ). Moreover, most
reflective individuals will weight the value of these distinct grounds in
different ways. Finally, there is plausibly no dispute-independent stan-
dard of the epistemic credentials by which one might be judged a “peer”:
philosophical atheists may think that only one’s capacity for intellectual
reasoning matters, whereas certain religious views claim, say, that purity
By ‘theist’ I mean to be as broad as possible: someone who thinks that an extremely
powerful, extremely knowledgeable, and extremely benevolent being exists.
For helpful overviews of epistemological issues arising from religious disagreement,
see King  and Pittard a.

of heart or selfless love for others is a precondition of learning the truth
about God (see esp. Pittard a, §). Thus even if there were consen-
sus on what kind of evidence in the religious domain is most probative,
there is no dispute-neutral way of assessing which epistemic credentials
one must have in order to properly assess that evidence.
Notice that these complications arise even on the assumption that
Uniqueness (discussed in § above), or some other strong Conciliationist
principle, is true. For these complications make it difficult, in matters of
religion, to discern what one’s total evidence actually is. Even if it is possi-
ble to establish in what one’s total evidence consists, related complications
involve which bits of evidence are most probative and so are to be given
most weight, and so what religious propositions that total evidence in fact
supports. And even if these matters are settled to everyone’s satisfaction,
other difficulties loom for whom is to count as a “peer” or as an epis-
temic “superior”; and if properly settling the above matters depends on
regarding only the right individuals as peers or superiors, then it should
be clear that there are many choice-points where things can go wrong,
and there will even be disagreement, at each juncture, over which way of
settling matters is wrong. As such, reaching agreement over Uniqueness,
or between Conciliationists and Steadfasters, will not necessarily help us
discern what is required in the face of religious disagreement.
Yet there are some for whom the mere fact of religious disagreement
plausibly recommends reconsideration of their position. For the compla-
cent theist (or atheist or agnostic), who acquired their view prereflectively
“at mother’s knee” and did not consider the reasons why their position
is correct, acknowledging the existence of disagreement should presum-
ably cause them rethink their position. Rosen (, ) has in mind the
complacent theist who takes himself upon reflection to have no positive
grounds for his belief: “no arguments, no compelling authority, and most
importantly, nothing that he would regard as direct experience of the di-
vine: a theist who believes simply because he has been immersed in a cul-
This problem may extend to proposals on which what matters isn’t having the same
evidence, but rather that one should judge another a peer when they are (roughly) as
justified, given their evidence, in holding their religious beliefs: see Lackey .

ture in which God’s existence is taken for granted.” Though Rosen thinks
it may be rationally permissible for even such a complacent theist to per-
sist simply as an act of faith, Rosen nevertheless thinks that he “probably
should reconsider when he realizes that this commitment is an accident
of history,” and that “there is something admirable in the choice to recon-
sider.” Though Rosen does not consider the comparably situated atheist
or agnostic, presumably similar thoughts apply. But we can go further
than Rosen; for there are those who complacently hold their view on the
basis of reasons they regard as compelling, though they’ve never really
considered arguments to the contrary. For the (a)theist who thinks she has
compelling grounds, yet who never bothered to consider others’ beliefs or
the reasons one might think differently, the existence of many who dis-
agree on the basis of different grounds should, if acknowledged, induce
one to reconsider. For acknowledging such disagreements involves learn-
ing that others have different grounds which one might find compelling,
if only one would give them an honest hearing.
Complacency aside, let us focus on those more reflective individuals
whose beliefs, at least on matters of religion, were (or are being) formed
while engaged with many differing perspectives and arguments. (In virtue
of reading this, I shall assume you are one of them.) For reflective indi-
viduals, it may be that recognizing the extent of disagreement about re-
ligious issues will sometimes put pressure on them to lower their confi-
dence, pushing them toward agnosticism. Indeed, a natural thought is
that the greater the diversity, the more that one should feel an episte-
mological problem with holding one’s own views. But as noted earlier,
whether it does (or must) will depend on specific factors concerning what
What is the status of their beliefs before they’ve acknowledged disagreement in this
way? Much depends here on one’s theory of knowledge. Some will want to say that their
beliefs lack “justification” until they’ve reckoned with the disagreement and rationally
assessed grounds for opposing views; still others will insist that even if “justified” and
true, such beliefs aren’t yet knowledge. I don’t have settled views on this, though I’m
enough of an externalist to be open to the idea that such beliefs could be “unreasonable”
knowledge in Lasonen-Aarnio’s () sense.
But see White  for a challenge to the idea that if there is an epistemological
problem of the diversity of opinion, it only gets worse in a larger universe with more
diversity.

counts as evidence, how to weigh evidence and expertise more generally,
and how charitable one has been to opposing views. Given these com-
plications, and that settling such matters can depend on disputed views
in epistemology, I am pessimistic that there can be any general epistemic
obligations arising from acknowledging the fact religious disagreement.
One question that arises is whether the great range of religious diver-
sity, between religions and within religions, provides a kind of support
for a particular take on how one’s own religious view relates to the oth-
ers. Hick () contends that such diversity supports a pluralism on
which a divine being of some kind is the revelatory source of all reli-
gions, but where the revelatory process necessarily involves cultural re-
ception which influences how different groups adopt and interpret reli-
gious claims. Thus we have different religious perspectives such as Hin-
duism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (among many others)
which are geographically and historical situated such that the dominant
cultural concepts and social priorities end up influencing how each under-
stands the divine. Looked at one way, Hick’s line can seem correct: a plu-
ralist picture, where each religious tradition is accurately (if incompletely)
referring to some core features of supernatural reality while also reflecting
varying cultural concepts, can look like a better explanation of religious
diversity than a particularist exclusivism on which only one religion is the
most accurate account of the supernatural. But on the assumption that
this pluralist picture is correct, it raises many questions: one such ques-
tion is why, if pluralism is correct, it is rarely a part of the doctrine of so
many religions. If pluralism gains some support from the fact of religious
diversity, it also seems at a loss to explain why so few religions have been
tolerant enough to allow such diversity.
Plantinga () argues forcefully that the fact of religious diversity,
and the pluralist’s handling of it, need not make a religious exclusivist sus-
pect that their own religious beliefs suffer from any irrationality or epis-
temic defect. Yet he allows that acknowledging the diversity of religious
perspectives could (though might not) defeat the knowledge which the be-
liever might otherwise have had in the absence of such acknowledgment
(, –), particularly if it leads one to worry that one believes as

one does largely due to the religious culture into which one was born. In
this way, knowing more about diversity may lead to less religious knowl-
edge, at least in the short run. Yet again, much will depend on the method
by which one gained such knowledge (if knowledge it is) in the first place.
If one has in fact gained knowledge of theism by direct acquaintance with
the truth of theism (either by apprehending the soundness of an ontolog-
ical proof, or by perceptual acquaintance with God), it is entirely unclear
why acknowledging disagreement must undermine that knowledge.
In what remains, I shall briefly consider two arguments concerning re-
ligious agreement and disagreement which I think deserve further atten-
tion. The first, discussed by Kelly () and Zagzebski (, ff.), is
the “common consent” (consensus gentium) argument for the existence of
God. The second argument, put forth by Thurow (), is that religious
disagreement can actually aid the case for theism, for it might, given an
Equal Weight View, rationally require us to end up agreeing on theism. It
would seem on a first pass that a theist could not appeal to both arguments
on behalf of their view, for one depends on widespread agreement about
theism, whereas the other depends on widespread disagreement. But as it
happens, these two arguments are not incompatible with each other.
Common consent arguments, in their most modest versions, appeal to
the large number of people who believe that p, and then suggest that this
common consent can at least provide significant evidence for p. While our
focus so far has been on religious disagreement, the common consent ar-
guer aims to capitalize on the widespread popularity—both currently and
historically—of theism, in order to claim that, while not decisive, this fact
is at least a reason in favor of theism. While treating common consent
as evidence for theism might seem implausible, notice that more gener-
ally, broad agreement (even if not unanimous consensus) that p arrived at
See White  for related issues.
Cf. Bogardus  for similar points. Mutatis mutandis if theism is false and it’s
possible to know, by “seeing” directly, that theism is false: acknowledging disagreement
from theists might not dislodge the atheist’s knowledge.
At least a strong supermajority. Kelly , , n.  cites one sociologist (whose
avowed goal is to show that non-belief is more prevalent than typically thought) who
estimates that around  percent of the global population is theist .

independently provides some evidence in favor of p. It does so because
the truth of p can figure in the best explanation of how broad agreement
would have been reached, at least if there are other plausible assumptions
about how so many would have arrived at the belief that p. However,
where people reach agreement that p in dependent fashion (such that their
reaching the same conclusion is due to collaboration or external pressure),
most will deny that broad agreement is evidence for p. Note also that
disagreement over p, if reached independently, can (if there are sufficiently
many on each side) provide reason to suspend judgment: for those who
found themselves confident that p (or that not-p), independently reached
disagreement offers higher-order evidence that one misjudged the initial
evidence. But disagreement similarly loses its force if one learns that such
disagreement arose in dependent fashion. So common consent arguers
for theism will need to make the case for enough independence among
the those in broad agreement that theism is true.
Thurow () argues that even given an Equal Weight View, there are
some cases of peer disagreement over p which rationally require not sus-
pension of judgment, but that the peers come to agreement that p. Such
cases can arise when the peers agree on the force of some body of evidence
E, but disagree on the force of some larger body of evidence F, where, if
they suspend judgment on the force of F, then E justifies belief in p for each
of them. If the peers can resolve their more basic disagreement over F first
by weighting their judgments about that proposition equally, then they
should do so (and continue doing) until their agreed upon evidence sup-
ports adopting the same attitude toward p. Thurow then argues that it is
possible to apply such insights, in a Bayesian framework, to how experts
disagreeing over the evidence for theism ought to proceed: such peers
See Kelly  for thoughtful discussion.
Suppose one learns that ten people believe p, while ten believe not-p. But one also
learns that their beliefs were formed by each telling the next, one by one, what they
believe, and they were lined up in such a way that the next listener was always inclined
to distrust and believe the negation of what their informant told them. In such a set-up,
the existence of such a balanced disagreement would not lead one to revise one’s belief,
if one believed, that p.
Perhaps by Thurow’s own ‘Straight Averaging Equal Weight’ model (, ),
which aims to capture the spirit of the Equal Weight View.

might diverge over the force of the total evidence, but be rationally re-
quired to reconcile their dissent by eventually coming to agreement that
theism is true, or that theism is false (which one depends on the details).
If Thurow’s approach to the Equal Weight View is right, then it may turn
out that just learning the probability distribution of these experts can ra-
tionally require that we work hard to come (after much honest toil) to
agreement over the matter of theism.
If a modest common consent argument has something to be said for
it, then we should expect to grant some weight to the fact of widespread
agreement in favor of theism. If Thurow is right, and it also is the case that
disagreement over theism, among experts, boils down largely to which
body of evidence those experts think matters for reaching a conclusion
about theism, then such experts will only proceed rationally if they work
together to resolve those disagreements and reach a consensus. And a
theist might argue along both lines, where her hope is that the latter ap-
proach should yield a consensus in favor of theism rather than atheism; in
this way, the two arguments are in principle compatible with each other.
Yet the prospects for what each argument can accomplish might seem
dim. Any modest evidence gained by a common consent appeal is likely
to be swamped by the force of other (first-order) evidence for or against
theism. And an approach along Thurow’s lines seems hampered by the
following facts: (i) dissenting experts typically disagree over what a given
body of evidence itself supports (and this can be because they find them-
selves with different prior probability distributions, or different views of
what can count as evidence); and (ii) these experts will have personal and
professional reasons for avoiding concession and resolution.
Note that someone wanting to use both arguments needn’t deny the plausible idea,
grounded in the probability calculus, that a proposition p is only evidence for some hy-
pothesis H just in case ¬p is evidence against H. For the common consent argument
appeals to widespread agreement among all manner of people, whereas Thurow’s Equal
Weight view appeals only to the disagreement among various peer experts.
And (iii) to undertake the project, one would need a vast sociological study to de-
termine who should be the selected experts, and then what their degrees of belief are
concerning (say) the probability that miracles have occurred, or the probability of theism
given the horrendous evils in our world.

 Conclusion
Where does all this leave us? We have surveyed the general issues arising
from the debates over the epistemology of disagreement, and considered
how some of those points carry over to religious epistemology and
religious diversity. In doing so, we have had to acknowledge the problems
arising from the meta-level disagreements among philosophers over how
best to deal with disagreement and the assessment of peer-hood, and over
what counts as evidence (of varying strengths) in the religious domain,
how easily one could come to know truths concerning matters of religion,
and whether testimony or perception or some other method of forming
beliefs would put one in an adequate position to believe even while
acknowledging disagreements. Even if epistemologists unanimously
agreed on some of the broader issues concerning the nature of evidence,
how to handle higher-order evidence, or the conditions for acquiring
knowledge through testimony, things would only be slightly improved;
because there would remain disagreement about, for example, how and
when those insights apply in religion, about when epistemic humility is a
virtue rather than a vice in matters of religion, and how (if at all) moral
and spiritual considerations come into play. Learning to live with such
disagreement is a part of the challenge.
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